The secularism of the Secular Democrats is a brave new faith all its own—one that wants to push religion out of the popular and legislative imagination.
The last 50 something years have been particularly interesting from the viewpoint of religiosity around the world. French Lebanese writer Amin Maalouf reminisced, writing at the dawn of the 21st century, that the five or so past decades have been marked by a phenomenon of growing attachment to religion in its more traditional definition, something that secular people often hail as “fundamentalism." He wondered whether this religiosity presents in itself a sort of culmination of globalism, especially after the fall of communism: as the young detach further and further from traditional modes of living, they are seeking the ultimate sense of belonging that transcends their particular sociopolitical situation, including a purely material reality that religion augments. Maalouf writes (author’s translation):
“For more than a century marxism promises to establish a totally new society encompassing the whole world, where the idea of God will be banished; the failure of this project, economically and politically, but also morally and intellectually, has precipitated the revival of [religious] beliefs that it [Marxism] wanted to throw into the dustbin of history. As a political and identitary refuge, religion became … an evident point of unity for those who fought against communism.”
Whatever the impetus for this may be, the trend is generally true if you look into the world of religious practice: the Catholic Church witnesses the growing traditional movement among the young; every generation of Orthodox Jews finds itself stricter than its parents; the most conservative interpretations of Islam take not only the hearts and minds of men and women around the world, but even of many governments, as we have seen since the time of decolonization.
It is curious how, as religiosity becomes more concentrated, the irreligious are becoming so numerous that there is an effort to regroup them politically.
Though the religious are becoming more religious, so grows the general irreligion in the West. In this context, it is particularly interesting to examine the case of Secular Democrats of America (SDA), a caucus that seeks to represent the “nones”—the ever-growing demographic of those who profess no religion and desire to thus manifest themselves politically. It is curious how, as religiosity becomes more concentrated, the irreligious are becoming so numerous that there is an effort to regroup them politically.
Upon the election of the Biden-Harris administration, the caucus published a report making suggestions to the new administration where they outline the supposed wrongs of the Trump-Pence administration, going as far as to say that “President Trump has violated basic constitutional principles and elevated religious privilege over the Bill of Rights and the common good.” Many points raised in the report may seem outlandish for American readers, but as I explore further, the same points are not unprecedented in the world at large, even in the West.
From a purely philosophical standpoint, secularism as a political moniker is odd since, in this case, a political identity is defined by the absence of something, by a negation. In positive terms, the caucus website defines its members with three notable terms: “humanist,” “nontheist,” and “atheist.” While the latter two may seem more concrete in their expression, the term “humanist” actually better exemplifies the philosophical focus of the caucus. It pops up frequently within the website’s resources.
Yet something is telling me that the “human” in humanist does not refer exactly to the same philosophical movement that brought us Erasmus, Saint Thomas More, or Italian Renaissance. Rather it is an iteration of John Lennon’s infamous song “Imagine,” asking you to “Imagine there's no heaven... No hell below us, above us only sky... Nothing to kill or die for, and no religion too.”
In other words, a vision of selectively tolerant materialism is taking hold of American public life.
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Then-candidate Joe Biden at the DNC, 2020.[/caption]
INSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM
Presently, the SDA is established in just a handful of states: Texas, Florida, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Nebraska. It may not be too widespread, but it is very determined. On its website, the caucus outlines its own history, starting almost exactly five years ago in Texas, hoping to represent the “nones” among the Nebraska and Arizona Democrats. By 2019, the DNC, according to the caucus itself, recognized the non-religious as a separate category within their “Interfaith Council." The caucus’ website provides an extensive annotated list of sources, as well as their plans to put more atheists and non-religious into positions of power over the country in coordination with the Center for Freethought Equality.
Under liberal secularism, religion gets pushed out of the political square to ‘go along to get along’ as an unnecessary and divisive subject.
This is what surprises the occasional visitor of the caucus’ website—their unwavering honesty in the face of their policy proposals. Since the election of the Biden-Harris administration, the caucus stopped updating their newsfeed, but they have been moderately active on Twitter since July 2020, where the presently small microblog promotes the progressive flavor of the DNC. (Note: as of June 25th 2021, there have been no new tweets in just over a month.)
My observations of French and English Canada, as well as of continental Europe and the United States, have brought me to a conclusion that institutional secularism—a political philosophy where secularism is adopted as a modus operandi by society’s institutions—breaks down into two larger categories: let’s call them militant secularism and liberal secularism.
The first type is often observable in countries where there had formerly been an established state religion or where one religion has been institutionally dominant. It is clearly visible, for example, in the French-speaking world, where the Catholic Church had historically been a dominant force, receiving a major institutional pushback in France throughout its many revolutions, as well as in French Canada since the 1960s. These types of societies find themselves generally opposed to all expressions of religion in the public space, whether it is the former dominant religion or other visible religions. Thus, in both France and Quebec, the predominantly French-speaking Canadian province, religious minorities, like Orthodox Jews, Sikhs, etc., occasionally get the short end of the stick.
Militant secularism is visibly present in continental Europe and in its spheres of influence, but this mentality has never really taken root in the Anglo-American world. Instead, we find the prevalence of liberal secularism. Considering that the Anglosphere since the 16th century has been rather fragmented religiously, between the newly established Church of England, the Catholic recusants, and various groups of Calvinist and Anabaptist inspirations, there was always a need for some sort of toleration. The Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Episcopalians of Virginia, the Catholics of Maryland, and the Puritans of New England were required to find a way to live together in unity. Yet very often, where there is toleration, relativism follows. Liberal secularism in its modern iteration respects all religions as being equally unimportant, perhaps making a rare distinction if a particular group could be considered fashionable and marginalized.
Under liberal secularism, religion gets pushed out of the political square to “go along to get along" as an unnecessary and divisive subject. A good example of that would be Jefferson’s Bible, a rendition of the New Testament by Thomas Jefferson that specifically aims to portray Christ only as a philosopher and an ethicist, purposefully eliminating all “religious” elements: Christ’s divinity, His miracles, etc. Militant secularism and liberal secularism have the same goal: to make religion obsolete. The first one does so by making it ostracized; the second, by making it meaningless.
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St. Patrick's Church, interior.[/caption]
BRAVE NEW WORLD
Seldom is a given society dominated by just one type of secularism. Usually, it is a combination of the two in different proportions. The same is the case for the SDA, though the message about religion coming from the caucus may appear to be rather conflicting. The decline of religion in the United States is presented as something undeniable and inevitable; an extensive list of material provided by the caucus seeks to showcase that American “nones” are an active, growing, and diverse demographic going beyond race and sex. At the same time, certain concerns of the caucus are presented with nothing less than alarmism, showcasing the religious, specifically Christians, as well-organized and dangerous people who have to be fended off in American public life. For example, The Good News Club: The Christian Right’s Stealth Assault on America’s Children, one of the two titles authored by journalist Katherine Stewart, is featured under “Book Recommendations” and annotated with the following comment: “A sobering look at the coordinated and well-funded effort by Christian Nationalists to advance a fundamentalist agenda in public schools.”
There are numerous entries on the caucus’ website trying to connect American Christianity with white supremacy.
Naturally, one of the chief boogeymen underscored by the caucus is religious opposition to “the Science™”: coronavirus regulations, vaccination exemptions, human stem cell research, etc. In a similar vein, healthcare is put under scrutiny because how dare Catholic hospitals providing “1 in 6 hospital beds” (taken from the caucus website) in America actually be Catholic.
And of course, there are numerous entries on the caucus’ website trying to connect American Christianity with white supremacy. For example, the site showcases The End of White Christian America by Dr. Robert P. Jones, along with his more recently published White Too long: The Legacy of White Supremacy in American Christianity. In the “Secularism 101” section, which precedes the book recommendations, we are presented with a link to a video “A National Conversation on White Supremacy and American Christianity.”
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Secular Democrats of America: official positions.[/caption]
"ONE NATION UNDER WHOM?"
When drawing a conclusion about what to think about the Secular Democrats of America, one has to understand what this group represents historically, politically, and philosophically for America and the rest of the world.
It would be foolish to deny that, like many other progressive interest groups, Secular Democrats of America are eyeing the possibility of implementing their ideas on the federal level, top-down.
Though America never had an established religion dictated top-down the way that many European countries did, America did have and still has a religious underpinning that is a force to be reckoned with, despite the country’s ever-growing religious heterogeneity. Nancy Pelosi still felt it necessary to reference her Catholicism in her public quibbles with President Trump. Moreover, do not forget how the current administration continues to reference President Biden as a “devout Catholic,” despite the fact that they vouched to pursue the Little Sisters of the Poor over contraception coverage—a policy that the SDA would unequivocally support: “We oppose religious exemptions that allow medical providers to deny healthcare.” Religious practice is a generational phenomenon that does not rise or fall sporadically and inconsequentially, and religion in its traditional expression still looms large in the American imagination.
Another key component is that many practices that the caucus proposes may feel foreign to the American mindset, where freedom of religion is doctrinal, but they are rather commonplace in other Western countries, where a combination of militant and liberal secularism, aided occasionally by generational disinterest to the matters among the citizenry, has effectively pushed religion out of popular and legislative imagination. In modern France, the anniversary of the passage of the law that, among other measures, confined religious buildings as the property of the state (see Titre III, Article 12) is celebrated civically as Secularism Day, December 9th. Still, even if “nones” are a growing demographic, those in the West who choose to stay within religious institutions are deepening their affiliation, something Maalouf underlined over 20 years ago. The question on the historical level would be whether religious America will be able to avoid the civic circumstances that brought about the secularization in other parts of the West.
In the United States, politically, the presence or absence of religion still greatly depends on state-level politics, as it did since the inception of the country. In many states, like West Virginia and North Carolina, religious thought still influences the everyday activities of residents, like commerce on Sundays. Therefore, one may suspect that the most active lobbying by the SDA would occur at the level of state legislatures. Consider the states where the caucus presently finds itself—these are mainly “swing states” where public opinion changes from one election cycle to another, and, from a purely pragmatic viewpoint, mobilizing the “nones” in these states is an effective long-term strategy to cement the presence of a particular type of Democrats in places of high contention.
The caucus provides a uniform, organized national effort aimed at promoting a very particular kind of secularism, with its own definition of reality, of humanity, of civility, and of America.
But we should not lose sight of the big picture: though the most effective strategy is to lobby on a state-by-state basis, it would be foolish to deny that, like many other progressive interest groups, the Secular Democrats of America are eyeing the possibility of implementing their ideas on the federal level, top-down. Their own Twitter feed is currently concerned primarily with federal decisions, like federal unemployment benefits and subsidized college education. They have a will and a vision to go beyond narrow policy proposals, something even many conservatives lack today. The caucus has a clear and publicly defined goal, similar to the institutionalist laws of French anti-clericals of the turn of the 20th century, and they are eager to acquire levers of power to achieve it: “We advocate for secular governance, promote respect and inclusion of non-religious Americans, and mobilize non-religious voters.”
Philosophically, the question still stands: is the secularism of the SDA a rejection of religion altogether or a brave new faith of its own? The close examination of the material provided by the SDA indeed brings the pendulum closer to the second option: the caucus provides a uniform, organized national effort aimed at promoting a very particular kind of secularism, with its own definition of reality, of humanity, of civility, and of America.
Of course, only time could tell how successful the efforts of the organization would be, for it is still young and relatively small. So, for now, let us be attentive and watch the progression of the Secular Democrats of America with great interest.
